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ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION 
The Issues for Resolution by the Supreme Court are as 
follows: 
1. Did the Defendants have possession of the Disputed 
Strip of land? 
2. Was the possession of the Disputed Strip by the 
Defendants sufficiently adverse to rebut the presumption of 
possession created by UCA 78-12-7,thus barring the Plaintiffs' 
claim for quiet title under UCA 78-12-5&6. 
3- Are the Defendants entitled to quiet title in the 
disputed strip based on the common law doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs asserted a claim to a strip of property 
that extended a 129.4' east of an existing fence line between 
the parties by attempting to build a new fence along the east 
edge of the disputed strip. The Defendants caused the posts to 
be returned to the Plaintiffs' property. The Plaintiffs filed 
suit, seeking to quiet title to the disputed strip, based on 
their alleged record title. The Defendants answered, 
denying the Plaintiffs' allegations, asserting boundary by 
acquiescence, and most recently, the affirmative defense of the 
Statute of Limitations, UCA 78-12-5 & 6. Both a pretrial and a 
trial were held. Evidence and testimony were presented to the 
Court. Both parties also presented motions for summary 
judgment which were held in abeyance by the Court. The Court 
issued a Written Decision quieting title to the dispute strip 
with the Plaintiffs. After a series of briefs and motions, the 
Court also issued its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree Quieting Title. The Defendants* appeal the 
decision of the District Court as set forth in its Decision, 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree 
Quieting Title. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Based on evidence submitted at trial and that 
stipulated to in the pretrial order, the following facts where 
presented to the District Court: 
1. The disputed strip of land is located in Millard 
County, Utah in the area known locally as the Fool Creek Flat, 
which is between Oak City and Leamington along State Highway 
U-125. The Defendants* Exhibit 7, (T 42-47, 53, 72-76, 80-82, 
90-93, 105, 106, 116, 137-138, 156-157, 160-174) admitted at 
trial identifies the properties of the parties, indicates the 
location of various fences and corner markers. The exhibit has 
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been reproduced as a part of this brief in order to expedite 
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Explanation of Defendants' Exhibit 7: 
T-l. This is the tract of land originally purchased by 
the predecessors of the Defendant, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc. It 
is not adjacent to the disputed strip. 
T-2. This is the tract of land purchased by Jos.. T. 
Finlinson, Inc., from the Defendant Gordon Nielson on June 5, 
1963. Included in the T-2 tract is the forty known as the SE 
1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W., SLB&M. This 
40 is located adjacent to the Plaintiffs' 80 described later 
herein. The boundary dispute occurs between this 40 and the 
Plaintiffs' 80. 
T-2a. This tract belongs to another Nielson, not a 
party to this action. Years ago, the Father of the Defendant 
Gordon Nielson entered into an oral agreement with Clarence 
Nielson, that this tract would be included with and treated as 
a part of T-2. A corresponding part of T-2, T2b would be 
included with and treated as a part of the other Nielson1s 
property. The tracts were then fenced accordingly. 
T-2b. See the explanation for T-2a above. 
T-3. The Plaintiffs' 80, also described as the South 
1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M. 
T-4. This is the disputed strip. It can be described 
as the East 129.4' of the S 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 34, T 
15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M. On this exhibit, T-4 is identified as the 
parcel contained within points, 5-6-7-8. This description 
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however does not describe the extra acreage in the disputed 
strip, 
1-2-3-4 represents the fence along the north side of 
U-125. 
5-6 represents the fence between the contesting 
parties, however it was built as part of the longer fence 2-5-6. 
8 represents the 1982 marker established by the BLM, 
which, according to the BLM, establishes the South 1/4 corner 
of Section 34, T 15 S, R 4 W, SLB&M. 
9 represents the SE corner of said Section 34 which 
was initially located in 1870 and was reestablished in 1915. A 
brass cap, however, was not placed in this location until 1982 
by the BLM. 
10 represents the SW corner of section 34 which was 
initially located in 1870 and was re-established in 1915. A 
brass cap was placed in this location in 1915 and is still in 
existence at this location. 
11-12-13-14 represent current gates in existing fence 
lines. 
The distance between points 8 and 10 is 2,689.93' and 
the distance between 8 & 9 is 2,689.98*. 
2. Patents from the Federal Government were issued to the 
predecessors of both parties. Roper's patent to the 40 next to 
the disputed line, 5-6 was issued in 1916 for the SE 1/4 of the 
SW 1/4 of section 34. Finlinson's predecessor's patent to the 
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40 next to the disputed line, 5-6 was issued in 1927 for the SW 
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 34, (T 132). Each patent conveyed 
a full 40, with no conflict appearing in the two descriptions, 
(T 132). 
3. Predecessors of each party were physically located 
on the properties before patents were issued, (T 180-181). 
4. At a time in the early history of the area, most 
likely about the turn of the century, there was an old wagon 
road between Oak City and Leamington that may have traversed 
part of the disputed strip, 5-6-7-8; however, the route was 
abandoned when U-125 was located in its present alignment and 
fence 1-2-3-4 was built on the north side of the highway, (T 
183) . 
5. The predecessors of the parties built fence 
2-5-6. Not one of the witnesses or any of the parties could 
remember when either fence had been built or remember when 
these fences had not existed. The oldest witness was 78 years 
old, (T 180). 
6. The parties and their predecessors have been 
engaged in the business of farming which includes the 
activities of growing crops, primarily hay and grain, both 
irrigated and dry farm, and raising cattle. The cattle of both 
parties and their predecessors would graze the land controlled 
by the respective fences of the parties and their predecessors 
from fence line to fence line. The cattle would forage in 
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these fields every year after the crops had been harvested 
until the cattle were returned to the summer ranges. This 
practice has not varied substantially since the original 
settlers arrived at the Fool Creek Flat, (T 182). 
7. The Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc. and its predecessors, 
Gordon Nielson, and the Estate of Peter Nielson, Peter Nielson 
and his wife, Ely, and Edgar Nielson and his family have always 
had T-2 fenced with barb wire and cedar post and within this 
enclosure conducted their farming activities to the exclusion 
of the Plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
8. The Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc. has improved the 
disputed strip in excess of $5 per acre so that it can be 
irrigated by sprinkling and has since such time plowed, 
planted, harvested and always grazed T-2 from fence to fence, 
(T 182). Plaintiffs exhibit 4, a photo, shows the ground 
plowed right up to the fence, 2-5-6. The Defendant, Gordon 
Nielson, testified that he plowed up to within 30 feet of the 
fence 2-5-6 during the years he farmed T-2 from 1950 to 1963, 
(T 166). He further testified that the only reason he didn't 
plow up to the fence line was because of a slight wash and 
brush and an old tractor which made it difficult and not 
economical to plow up to the fence line. Plaintiffs* exhibit 
3, a 1963 aerial map, clearly shows that T-2 has been cleared 
from brush along the disputed fence line, 5-6 and is consistent 
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with the testimony offered by the Defendants as to their use of 
the land included in the T-2 tract, (Exhibit 3). 
9. The issue of the disputed tract, T-4 was not 
raised until after the survey work done by the BLM in the 
summer of 1982. Until such time, the records of the Millard 
County Recorder, Defendants' exhibit 7, showed that each party 
had a full 80 along the south boundary of section 34. When the 
south quarter corner marker was established at point 8 in 1982, 
the dispute flared and this litigation ensued, (Exhibit 7) . 
10. The issue of access by the Plaintiffs is disputed 
and clearly at issue. The Plaintiffs maintain that they have 
always obtained access to U-125 by coming out of gate 11, 
traveling south next to fence, 2-5-6, and exiting through gate 
12. The Defendants claim that gate 12 was not built until the 
late 70's when a new fence was built, 1-2-3, in the old 
alignment, (T 183,203-204). The Defendants also testified of 
gates 13 and 14 farther to the west that were used by the 
Plaintiffs for access to T-3. Upon cross examination, the 
Plaintiffs admitted that the public had not had access to T-3 
since fence 1-2-3-4 was built along the north edge of U-125 (T 
25, 224). They also admitted that their access was only to 
remove crops when they were grown on T-3. They further 
admitted that when using such access that they only used up to 
the first 20' of the disputed strip 5-6-7-8 for such limited 
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access, (T 222-223)- The only use of the Plaintiffs to the 
disputed strip is this very limited crop removal access. The 
Plaintiffs further testified that they had never grazed their 
cattle east of fence 2-5-6, or that they had ever plowed, 
planted or harvested any crops east of fence 2-5-6. 
11. The title to the SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 
34 has been transferred by deed to Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc., 
see testimony of Fred L. Finlinson, (T 133). 
12. The Defendant, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc., has a 
crop sharing arrangement with Spencer Butler for the operation 
of T-2, but the agreement does not provide for the transfer of 
or effect legal title to T-2 in any way, (T 209). 
13. The Defendant, Rich L. Finlinson, is an officer 
of the corporation, Jos.. T. Finlinson, Inc., but has not 
entered into any contracts effecting the title to the disputed 
strip in any individual capacity, (T 209). 
14. The Plaintiffs started to build fence 7-8 after 
the placement of the marker of the South quarter corner of 
section 34 by the BLM without notice to the Defendants. The 
Defendants gave notice to the Plaintiffs that such action was 
considered a trespass and requested the Plaintiffs to remove 
the posts or the posts would be removed and placed on T-3, 
(Exhibit 15). The Plaintiffs did not remove the posts, as 
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requested, so Defendants did remove the posts and placed the 
posts back on T-3 for the Plaintiffs use. The Plaintiffs had 
knowledge of the removal and the fact that the posts were on 
their property and took no further action to secure such posts, 
(T 182a). Defendants exhibit 15 is a copy of the letter giving 
notice to the Plaintiffs requesting the removal of the posts. 
15. The parties and their predecessors since the 
erection of fence 5-6 have jointly maintained this fence, (T 
185-188). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at the trial court indicated 
that the Defendants had possession of the disputed strip since 
the predecessors of the parties established the fence between 
the two separate parcels of property. The date of the 
establishment of this fence was not known by any of the parties 
or witnesses. It was before patents were issued, and one of 
the witnesses who was 78 at the time of trial, could never 
remember when the fence was not in its present location. From 
the dates when patents were issued, the existing fence line has 
separated the ownership of the respective parties. 
The Defendants were found by the Court in its Decision 
to have been in possession based on evidence which indicated 
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that it had been fenced and was a part of either the 
Defendants' or their predecessor's agriculture operations since 
settlement of the area. The property in dispute was enclosed 
by a substantial barrier, a three strand barb wire fence, was 
grazed, farmed, (dry land wheat initially and later barley and 
other types of grain)) and most recently, irrigated by 
sprinkling system to support the growth of barley and other 
grains. The only use of this disputed strip by the Plaintiffs, 
since the abandonment of the old dirt road, which occurred 
prior to the memory of any of the parties or witnesses, was an 
occasional use of the land immediately east of the existing 
fence for the removal of harvested crops which may not have 
occurred in some years. Occasional it was also used for access 
for maintenance of the existing fence. This use as road way, 
was limited to a portion of the disputed strip immediately east 
of the fence. 
The actual possession of the Defendants' rebuts the 
presumption of possession accorded the Plaintiffs by UCA 
78-12-7, (presumption of possession to the record title holder 
unless rebutted by evidence of possession which is adverse to 
the record title holder). Note: Appendix 1 which is attached 
contains the full text of all statutes cited herein. The type 
of possession which must be found to be adverse, is set forth 
in UCA 78-12-9 for those claiming under written instrument and 
under UCA 78-12-11 for those claiming without written 
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instrument. The Defendants have a claim under both a written 
instrument, i.e. recorded conveyances from patent, and 
unwritten, by acquiescence. The Defendants' possession 
qualifies under either section. The Plaintiffs' presumption of 
possession does not overcome the facts of the Defendants1 
actual possession. 
The issue of the payment of taxes has not be properly 
analyzed because each party has paid the taxes for a full 80 on 
each side of the disputed fence. In the 1982 BLM survey, an 
extra 99.91' were found to exist and the BLM established the 
South quarter corner in the middle of this extra acreage. Thus 
the east 79* of the disputed strip has not be taxed by Millard 
County. Neither of the parties have been taxed or have paid 
for this extra acreage. The Plaintiffs have not paid taxes on 
the East 79' of the disputed strip, they have not had adverse 
possession because of the Defendant's actual possession, 
therefor they have not fully qualified for quiet title by 
adverse possession. 
The Plaintiffs are barred by the Statue of 
Limitations, both UCA 78-12-5 & 6 on their claim for quiet 
title based on their record of title because they have not had 
possession of the disputed parcel. To avoid the bar, they must 
prove their possession, not simply benefit from a rebutted 
presumption of possession. 
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The Defendants, who have had adverse possession, have 
also not paid taxes on the extra acreage and they are not 
entitle to quiet title based on adverse possession. In this 
absence of a statutory remedy, the common law doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, provides the only remedy that 
resolves this dispute. The boundary was established by the 
predecessor's of the parties. It has been honored until 1982 
when the extra acreage was first discovered. The Defendants 
should be awarded quiet title based on the established fence 
line* 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS HAD POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED STRIP SINCE 
PREDECESSORS OF PARTIES ESTABLISHED THE EXISTING BOUNDARY FENCE 
A. Defendants' possession was acknowledged by the 
District Court. 
In its written Decision, dated September 13, 1985, 
pages 179 to 182 of the District Court record, the Court found 
that for over 50 years that the Defendants and their 
predecessors had occupied the disputed strip for their farming 
operations as a part of a larger parcel of property, "T-2," 
that the Defendants' possession required court eviction to 
allow the Plaintiffs to possess the disputed strip and that the 
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fence which separated the parties property had been in 
existence for over 50 years. 
B. Defendants' asserted claims under a written 
instruments and by asserting boundary by acquiescence, which is 
an unwritten claim. 
The Defendants purchased a large Tract from the 
Nielsons, (T 134), who had a chain of title back to the 
issuance of the original patent. The seller, Gordon Nielson, 
represented and the purchaser, Jos. T. Finlinson, Inc, 
understood that the property being sold which included the 
SWl/4 of the SEl/4, covered all the property within the Nielson 
fence lines, from fence to fence, (T 160). Seller has now 
conveyed such property by deed to the Defendants, (T 133). 
C. Since before Patent, the Defendants' predecessors 
in title, the Nielson's have fenced, farmed and grazed the 
disputed strip in the operation of their agricultural 
operation. Refer to the testimony of Gordon Nielson, (T 
160-178) . 
D. Since the purchase from the Nielson's, the 
Defendants have maintained the existing boundary fence, have 
farmed raising grain crops, recently irrigated with the use of 
a sprinkling system to enhance the growth of the grain crops, 
grazed for forage for its commercial beef herd during the late 
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fall, winter, and early spring of each year since purchase. 
Refer to the testimony of Rich L. Finlinson, (T 179-200), 
Spence Butler, (T 201-214), and Fred L. Finlinson, (T 129-159) 
and Exhibits 3, 4, and 7. 
E. The Plaintiffs have not farmed or grazed their 
cattle on the disputed strip. See the testimony of Grayson 
Roper, (T 48), and Bruce Roper, (T 109). The maximum use by 
the Plaintiffs since the closure of the old mail road, which 
occurred prior to the memory of any of the parties or witness, 
has been as a right of way to remove crops in some years or to 
maintain the existing fence, Testimony of Grayson Roper, (T 48) 
and Bruce Roper, (T 106-109). At best, the trial record 
supports a possible easement by prescriptive right for the 
removal of an occasional crop. 
II. REBUTTAL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF THE RECORD 
TITLE HOLDER DOES NOT REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF TAXES PLUS A 
SHOWING OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The District Court erred when it required the 
Defendants in this case to prove adverse possession and the 
payment of taxes in order to rebut the presumption of 
possession provided by UCA 78-12-7. 
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In order to find that the Defendants occupied the 
disputed strip, that the Defendants had to be evicted for the 
Plaintiffs to possess the disputed strip, the court actually-
found that the Defendants had possession of the disputed 
strip. See written Decision, (T 179-182) of the District Court 
Record. Such a finding rebuts by definition, any finding that 
the Plaintiffs had possession. UCA 78-12-5 requires the 
Plaintiffs to "be seized or possessed of the property...within 
seven years before the commencement of the action." UCA 78-12-6 
requires a similar possession for either a Plaintiff or a 
defendant to be "seized or possessed" for seven years. When 
the court finds that the Defendants occupied the disputed 
property, it has rebutted the presumption of UCA 78-12-7. The 
property can not be occupied by both parties. This position 
was fully argued in the Defendants* Memorandum In Support of 
Defendants1 Motion for a New Trail, Pages 199 to 213 of the 
District Court record. 
III. THE DEFENDANTS1 POSSESSION WAS ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS' 
AND REBUTS ANY PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION TO THE RECORD TITLE 
OWNER. STANDARDS FOR JUDGING ADVERSITY OF POSSESSION HAVE BEEN 
SET FORTH IN BOTH STATUTE AND THE CASE LAW AND THE DEFENDANTS' 
POSSESSION MEETS BOTH STANDARDS FOR ADVERSITY. 
A. Statutory definitions for adverse possession have 
been defined in UCA 78-12-9 for possession under a claim based 
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on a written instrument. This possession is deemed adverse if 
such occupancy was either 1) usually cultivated or improved, 2) 
protected by a substantial enclosure, 3) used for purpose of 
husbandry or for pasturage or the ordinary farming use of the 
occupant, or 4) when the parcel was a part of a larger parcel 
or farm that was used or farmed, the use of the unused part is 
deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the 
improved part of the farm. 
The Statutory definitions of adversary possession for 
an unwritten claim, UCA 78-12-11 include possession which is 
deemed adverse when it 1) has been protected by a substantial 
enclosure, 2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved 
or 3) where labor or money has been expended for the purpose of 
irrigating such lands in excess of $5 per acre. 
The facts presented to the District Court as 
summarized in the Statement of Facts, and as found by the 
District Court in its Written Decision, clearly set forth 
possession deemed to be have been adversely held, UCA 78-12-8 & 
10, therefore any such findings of possession rebut a 
presumption of possession, provided in UCA 78-12-7. 
B. The Utah Case law in a line of cases supports the 
use of land as pasturage as adverse possession, Adams v. 
Lamico, 118 U. 209, 221 P2d 1037, even a three week use for 
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sheep grazing is adverse, Copper v. Carter Oil Co., 7 U(2d) 9, 
316 P2d 320. 
IV. NEITHER PARTY PAID TAXES FOR PORTIONS OF THE DISPUTED 
WHERE THE EXISTING FENCE LINE IS LOCATED, THEREFORE NEITHER 
PARTY CAN ADVERSE POSSESS THE OTHER PARTY HAS REQUIRED BY UCA 
78-12-12. 
The testimony of James A. Cox, the Millard County 
Surveyor, in his deposition which was admitted by the District 
Court as evidence, states that the distance of the south line 
of Section 34, was in excess of one mile, the Roper half was 
2689.98 and the Finlinson half was 2689.93' for a total of 
5379.91', see pages 12-13 of the Cox deposition. The excess 
amounted to 99.91'. Since patent, the competing parties 
property has been described legally on the records of Millard 
County as exactly 80 acre tracts of land. See Cox deposition, 
Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
When the BLM Surveyor in 1982 found the extra acreage 
mentioned above, he followed BLM policy and established the 
Southwest Corner at the site of the 1915 Brass Cap, "10", then 
measured approximately one mile north, "10-9" and found the 
site where four existing fence lines established the Southeast 
Corner "9" and placed a Brass Cap at this point. He then used 
the single proportionate method of re-establishment, which 
means that the distance, including the extra footage was 
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divided equally, with the new South Quarter Corner, "8", being 
the mid point between the Southwest and the Southeast corners. 
See Zaninovich's testimony, (T 64-65). 
This single porportionate method of reestablishment is 
a well established practice, See Cox deposition, (T 19-20); 
however, it means that neither party was ever taxed by Millard 
County for the extra 99.91' which was not found until 1982 by 
the BLM. Each Party and their predecessor's were only assessed 
and paid on an exact 80 acre tract which left a strip of 
property almost a 100' wide that has never been either assessed 
and therefore never paid by either party. When the Plaintiffs 
are given credit for paying the taxes on the S 1/2 of the SWl/4 
of Section 34, T15S, R 4W, it leaves the east 79.42' of the 
disputed 129.4 strip beyond the description on which the 
Plaintiffs were assessed or paid taxes on. (Roper's half 
2689.94 "10-8", - a regular 80, 2640.0 = 49.98'. The disputed 
Strip, 129.4', - the Roper's share of the extra footage, 49.98' 
= the amount of the disputed not taxed to or paid by the 
Roper's, 79.42'. Thus the south quarter corner, "8", was 
approximately 50' beyond the acreage actually taxed by Millard 
County to either Party; therefore neither party can quiet title 
under the provisions of UCA 78-12-12. 
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V. THE ONLY REMEDY AVAILABLE TO RESOLVE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE 
DISPUTED STRIP IS THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE. 
The Plaintiffs had basically two claims for ownership 
of the disputed tract, either adverse possession or record 
title. To successfully assert record ownership based on the 
1982 BLM survey, the Plaintiffs must get pass the bar contained 
in both UCA 78-12-5 & 6 which requires seven years of 
possession. A finding of actual possession in the Defendants 
as the court found in its Written Decision and as facts compel, 
raises the bar of the Statute of Limitations and the 
Plaintiffs' claim based on record title fails. In order for 
the Plaintiffs to prevail on an adverse possession claim, under 
UCA 78-12-12, the Plaintiffs must show adverse possession plus 
payment of taxes. This claim must fail because the Plaintiffs 
never claimed adverse possession. The court created only a 
presumption of possession, which its own findings rebutted, and 
coupled with the fact that neither party paid taxes on the 
99.91' of extra acreage found to exist in 1982, the Plaintiffs 
have not qualified for quiet title under UCA 78-12-12. 
The Defendants can not claim, nor did the Defendants 
ever claim, that it had a claim under UCA 78-12-12 for the 
disputed strip, because it was clear that the Defendants had 
only paid the taxes on its 2640' even though it had clearly 
occupied the disputed strip to the exclusion of the Plaintiff. 
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It is clear however, that the Defendants did have possession of 
the entire disputed strip to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs so 
that the Defendants can raise the affirmative defense of UCA 
78-12-5 & 6 to the Plaintiffs' claims. The Defendant's 
possession also allows its unwritten claim of acquiescence to 
the disputed Strip of property to be considered. 
The remaining remedy is the common law of acquiescence 
as found in a line of Utah cases under the often cited and 
familiar ruling in the case of Fuoco v. Williams, 18 U2d 282, 
421 P2d 944. The sanctity and integrity of such a title were 
approved also in Farrer v. Johnson, 2 U2d 189, 271 P2d 462 
(1954), where, in addressing UCA 78-12-12, the Utah Court said: 
"Plaintiffs' record titles in the two cases are barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, UCA 78-12-5 and 6," and that: 
"The presumption of possession statute . . . 
requires a person to establish a legal title 
before the occupation of the property by 
another is deemed to have been in 
subordination to the legal title. Here, 
Plaintiffs' prima facie case of legal title 
established by introducing in evidence the 
deeds in question was overcome by 
Defendants' proof of title by adverse 
possession, so plaintiff failed to establish 
legal title." 
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Substitute "title by acquiescence" for "adverse 
possession" in the above quote, and we have the instant case. 
The "possession" presumed to have been in the 
plaintiff, flies in the teeth of that part of the decision that 
"the tract has been occupied by the defendant, its predecessors 
and others for over 50 years for both farming, and to gain 
access to other areas of their property." 
An examination of the pleadings, shows that the 
Plaintiffs' cause of action is based on "government markers" 
and that defendant failed to prove it was an adverse possessor 
under the statutes. Neither side took such a position in their 
pleadings or proof,, The plaintiff has invented the idea that 
defendant claimed, under the adverse possession statutes, which 
is fallacious. Defendants' claim is non-statutory and one 
based upon physical facts to demonstrate title by acquiescence. 
On the other hand, the District Court has espoused the 
idea that defendants claimed under the statute, but failed for 
non-payment of taxes. This was a gratuity the defendant never 
embraced and one completely antithetical to its theory of title 
by acquiescence, which, it is urged, was proved by a great 
preponderance of the evidence. 
By deciding in Plaintiffs' favor on the assumption 
that they were "presumed" to have possession of the property 
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for seven years before filing their action, it follows that the 
defendant could not have had possession during such period. 
The facts belie such a conclusion, and besides, the Court found 
and decided that defendants did have such possession which was 
included in a continuous period of over 50 years. There is no 
question raised as to the other 3 requirements to establish 
title by acquiescence, announced in the Fuoco case, i.e., (2) 
"occupation up to a visible line marked by . . . fences, (3) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary (there being no 
evidence otherwise), by (4) adjoining landowners. 
The facts supporting defendants" claim of title by 
acquiescence, briefly may be condensed as follows: 
Both parties claim their adjoining tracts by mesne 
conveyances stemming from federal patents, to predecessors in 
title then in possession. The tracts were in a rugged, 
sparsely settled area where people traveled by horse and wagon 
and where land was cheap, and title records difficult to come 
by in most cases, quite unlike the urban scenario existing at 
the time of Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P2d 500 (1984), a case to 
which plaintiff quickly turned after this suit was filed, not 
to support a basic claim of title by written instrument, but to 
shift to a strange, new and novel theory of "title by 
government marker". (Note: The Halladay case did not so 
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decide, but may have invited such doctrine, by suggestion, the 
case having been decided on a tort theory of negligence, 
denying one title if he fails to go to the County Recorder or 
federal land records depository, or surveys, to check the 
accuracy of his claimed title). 
In the instant case, predecessors of the parties built 
the fence which existed beyond the time of living octogenarian 
witnesses, and it persists intact to date. Both parties and 
their forebear raised crops and livestock on their sides of the 
fence and the land has been cultivated so as to render 
sprinkling a realistic and practical means of irrigation. 
Aerial photos reflect such continued use, without any apparent 
interruption. There was no evidence of any other reason for 
the fence other than a boundary until the present litigation, 
after a road, commonly used by occupiers of the adjoining 
tracts and others by permission, used as dirt road to go to and 
from Leamington, Utah, which road was closed about the turn of 
the century with the advent of a County road serving the same 
purpose. 
The facts of this case, in most part undisputed, 
clearly call for title by acquiescence in defendant under the 
Utah cases decided up to the time of the Halladay case in 1984, 
which case the plaintiff loudly acclaimed and cited in the 
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instant case in its latest pleadings. Plaintiff attempts to 
distract from the real issue here, by now claiming that 
defendant has not shown diligence in going to the archives for 
proof of title and by ignoring government markers which 
denegrates the principle of title by acquiescence. This is an 
attack on Defendants' title. It is axiomatic that one must 
rely on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of 
his opponent's. 
The Utah cases reflect the wisdom and practicability 
of quieting title by acquiescence in cases like the one we have 
here. 
The theory of the Halladay case simply being that 
before one can assert title by acquiescence, he must first 
examine, as an abstracter would, the official records, failing 
which, such record prevails over an already valid claim of 
title born of possession and use within ancient markers or 
fences without objection by neighbors or by consent, express or 
implied. Merely as reminders, the following may be presented: 
In Provonsha v. Pitman, 305 P2 486 (1957), the Utah 
Supreme Court unanimously announced that: "The sole problem is 
whether the facts reasonably support the conclusion that a 
boundary by acquiescence was established over the years," and 
that: 
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"the disputed area represents about 5% of 
the land plaintiffs claim. We note this 
fact not only to show the almost 
infinitesimal value of the land at that 
time, but to suggest the likelihood that, in 
those early days when land was literally 
dirt cheap in the area, persons reasonably 
may have preferred to establish what might 
have been a not too accurate boundary and to 
have been content that it should be the 
dividing line, rather than to expend a sum 
that, undoubtedly would have exceeded the 
value of the land involved." 
And in King v. Fronk, 378 P2 893 (1963) it was said that: 
"It is significant in most cases, a 
physical, visible means of marking the 
boundary was effected at a time when it was 
cheaper to risk the mistake of a few feet 
rather than to argue about it, go to Court, 
or indulge the luxury of a survey, pursuance 
of any of which motives may have proved more 
costly than the possible but most expedient 
sacrifice of a small land area. The rub 
comes when, after many years, land value 
appreciation tempts a test of the 
vulnerability of a claimed ancient 
boundary. The struggle usually involves 
economics. Nothing is wrong in the urge to 
acquire or retain. But neither is there 
anything wrong in the law's espousal of a 
doctrine that says that with the passage of 
a long time, accompanied by an ancient 
visible line, marked by monuments with other 
pertinent and particular facts, and with a 
do-nothing history on the part of the 
parties concerned, can result in putting to 
rest titles to property and prevent 
protracted and often belligerent litigation 
usually attended by dusty memory, departure 
of witnesses, unavailability of trustworthy 
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testimony, irritation with neighbors and the 
like. This idea is based on the concept 
that we must live together in a spirit 
justifying repose or fixation of title where 
there has been a disposition on the part of 
neighbors to leave an ancient boundary as is 
without taking some affirmative action to 
assert rights inconsistent with evidence of 
a visible, long-standing boundary." 
One of the reasons that reflects Halladay's 
inapplicability here was voiced in Eckberg v. Bates, 239 P2 205 
(1951) where it was said that: 
"Appellants contend that the evidence 
adduced herein is insufficient to sustain 
this finding because at the time this 
fence was built, a survey could have 
determined the true boundary line and 
therefore the element of uncertainty 
necessary in establishing a boundary line 
by acquiescence was lacking. It is true 
that the line called for by the deeds 
could have easily been ascertained by a 
survey. However, a boundary line may be 
"uncertain" or "in dispute" even though 
it is capable of being readily 
ascertained. The vital question is 
whether the adjacent owners when they 
fixed the line or acquiesced in its being 
fixed were uncertain or in dispute about 
the location of the actual line." 
See also, Willie v. Local Realty, 175 P2 718 (1946) 
Again, in Baum v. Defa, 525 P2 725 (1971), Mr. Justice 
Crockett, speaking for a unanimous Court said: 
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"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
derives from realization, ancient in our 
law, that the peace and good order of 
society is best served by leaving at rest 
possible disputes over long established 
boundaries. Its essence is that where there 
has been any type of a recognizable physical 
boundary, which has been accepted as such 
for a long period of time, it should be 
presumed that any dispute or disagreement 
over the boundary has been reconciled in 
some manner." 
And again the Court said in Harding v. Allen, 353 P2 911: 
"The existence of a fence that in 1937 was 
so aged as to be rotting away certainly 
justified the conclusion that it had been 
there for a long time, and this fact, absent 
any affirmative action by anyone insisting 
on its removal from 1937 and 1954, bears but 
the correctness of the trial court's finding 
that a boundary by acquiescence equitably 
had been established, under principles 
enunciated and reaffirmed by this court and 
summarized by Mr. Chief Justice McDonough in 
Ringwood v. Bradford, particularly that part 
quoted from Brown v. Milliner." 
It would appear to be unthinkable that the heirs of 
pioneers in 1882 and their descendants of 1915, when records 
were made in government depositaries, who relied on natural and 
other monuments, and their neighbors1 integrity, would lose 
their inherited land because of a 1984 developer claimed such 
heirs had not ridden horseback and later in T. Model Fords, 
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over miles of dusty wilderness roads to read a puzzling metes 
and bounds description on a deed to assure them peaceful 
possession and title to land occupied by them and their 
forebears for over half a century. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court by finding that 
the Defendants possessed the disputed strip. That such 
possession rebutted the presumption of possession created by 
the court from UCA 78-12-7 and that such possession by the 
Defendants is a bar to the Plaintiffs1 claim under title of 
recorder owner and to its claim under adverse possession. This 
court should quiet title to the disputed strip in the 
Defendants based upon the doctrine of acquiescence and the 
Defendants/Appellants should be awarded its costs incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
DATED this /y^day of October, 1986. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Fr^d W. Finlanson 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
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TEXT OP UTAH STATUTES CITED 
S. Seizure or possession within seven years 
ssary. 
action for the recovery of real propeny or for 
ssession thereof shall be maintained, unless it 
s that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
essor was seized or possessed of the propeny 
stion within seven years before the commen-
t of the action. 1953 
5 .1 . Seizure or possession within seven 
n - Proviso - Tax tide. 
action for the recovery of real property or for 
ossession thereof shall be maintained, unless 
aintiff or his predecessor was seized or posse-
af such propeny within seven years from the 
lencement of such action; provided, however, 
vith respect to actions or defenses brought or 
losed for the recovery or possession of or to 
title or determine the ownership of real prop-
igamst the holder of a tax title to such prop-
no such action or defense shall be commenced 
erposed more than four years after the date of 
ix deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such 
itle unless the person commencing or lnterpo-
such action or defense or his predecessor has 
ily occupied or been in possession of such 
m y wuhin four years prior to the commence-
or interposition of such action or defense or 
n one year from the effective date of this 
dment. ' i*s3 
-5 .2 . Holder of tax title - Limitations of 
ion or defense - Proviso. 
i action or defense for the recovery or posses-
of real propeny or to quiet title or determine 
iwnership thereof shall be commenced or inte-
nd against the holder of a tax title after the 
ation of four years from the date of the sale, 
eyance or transfer of such tax title to any 
ty, or directly to any other purchase [purchaser] 
of at any public or private tax sale and after 
xpiration of one year from the date of this act 
ided, however, that this section shall not bar 
action or defense by the owner of the legal title 
ich propeny where he or his predecessor has 
illy occupied or been in actual possession of 
propeny within four years from the commen-
nt or interposition of such action or defense, 
provided further, that this section shall not bar 
defense by a city or town, to an action by the 
er of a tax title, to the effect that such city or 
i holds a hen against such propeny which is 
1 or superior to the claim of the holder of such 
Itle 1953 
2-5.3. Definition of "tax title" [and "action" 
separability]. 
le term "tax title" as used in section 78-12-
and sect ion 59-10-65 , and the related 
nded sections 78-12-5 1, 78-12-7, and 78-
2, means any title to real propeny, whether 
I or not, which has been derived through or is 
ndent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of 
propeny in the course of a statutory procee-
for the liquidation of any tax levied against 
property whereby the propeny is relieved from 
{lien 
nition of "Action " 
The word "action" as used in these sections 
ides counterclaims and cross-complaints and 
ivil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought 
Llidity in P a n . 
If any section or pan of section of this act shall 
leld invalid, it shall not invalidate the remaining 
ions of this act. 1953 
75-12-6. Actions or defenses founded upon title 
to real estate. 
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to 
an action, founded upon the title to real propeny or 
to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effec-
tual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting 
the action7"or interposing the" defense or counterc-
laim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted 
or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, 
predecessor or grantor of such person was seized or 
possessed of the property in question within seven 
years before the committing of the act in respect to 
which such action is prosecuted or defense or cou-
nterclaim made. i933 
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession 
presumed in owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real propeny, 
or the possession thereof, the person establishing a 
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by 
law; and the occupation of the propeny by any 
other person shall be deemed to have been under 
and in subordination to the legal title, unless it 
appears that the propeny has been held and posse-
ssed adversely to such legal title for seven years 
before the commencement of the action. i*S3 
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession - Presumption -
Proviso - Tax title. 
In every action for the recovery or possession of 
real property or to quiet title to or determine the 
owner thereof the person establishing a legal title to 
such property shall be presumed to have been pos-
sessed thereof within the time required by law; and 
the occupation of such property by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subord-
ination to the legal title, unless it appears that such 
propeny has been held and possessed adversely to 
such legal title for seven years before the commen-
cement of such action. Provided, however, that if in 
any action any party shall establish pnma facie 
evidence that he is the owner of any real propeny 
under a tax title held by him and his predecessors 
for four years prior to the commencement of such 
action and one year after the effective date of this 
amendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of 
such property by adverse possession unless it 
appears that the owner of the legal title or his pre-
decessor has actually occupied or been in possession 
of such propeny under such title or that such tax 
title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay 
all the taxes levied or assessed upon such propeny 
within such four-year period 1953 
78-12-8. Lnder written instrument or judgment. 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those 
under whom he claims, entered into possession of 
the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
right, founding such claim upon a written instru-
ment as being a conveyance of the property in que-
stion, or upon the decree or judgment of a compe-
tent court, and that there has been a continued 
occupation and possession of the propeny included 
in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some 
part of the property under such claim, for seven 
vcars, the property so included is deemed to have 
been held adversely, except that when the property 
so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the 
possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of 
any other lot of the same tract. 1953 
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78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession 
under wntten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse poss-
ession by any person claiming a title founded upon 
a wntten instrument or a judgment or decree, land 
is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
mclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been 
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, 
for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or 
for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been 
partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot 
that may have been left not^cleared or not inclosed 
according to the usual course and custom of the 
adjoining county is deemed to have been occupied 
for the same length of time as the part improved 
and cultivated. 1953 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written 
instrument or judgment. 
Where it appears that there has been an actual 
continued occupation of land under claim of title, 
exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
wntten instrument, judgment or decree, the land so 
actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have 
been held adversely. 1953 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not 
under wntten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse poss-
ession by a person claiming title, not founded upon 
a written instrument, judgment or decree land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the 
following cases o n l y 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
mclosure 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended 
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or 
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 'ands 
amounting to the sum of 55 per acre 1953 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and 
taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considerea 
established under the provisions of any section or 
this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has 
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven 
years continuously, and that the party, his predece 
ssors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according 
to law 1953 
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes -
Proviso - Tax title. 
In no case shall adverse possession be established 
under the provisions of this code, unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed 
for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid 
all the taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law Provided, 
however, that payment bv the holder of a tax title to 
real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes 
levied and assessed upon such real propeny after the 
delinquent tax sale or transfer under which he 
claims for a period of not less than four years and 
for not less than one year after the effective date of 
this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of this section in regard to the 
payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse 
possession. 1953 
